



Raphael Carvalho
[@raphael_scarv](#)

just found out that [#SSH](#) doesn't use DIRECT IO to open *.pem, which means private key goes to page cache, which means attacker may exploit meltdown to discover your private key. I may come up with a POC. Watch it! [#MELTDOWN pic.twitter.com/1NuYzFWGBd 10:45 - 6 janv. 2018](#)

```
open("/home/utroz/.ssh/raphaelsc_aws.pem", 0_RDONLY) = 4
fstat(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0400, st_size=1696, ...}) = 0
read(4, "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r"..., 4096) = 1696
close(4) = 0
```

[Twitter](#)

par: [Raphael Carvalho @raphael_scarv](#)



Cliff O'Sullivan [6 janv.](#)
[@cliffsull](#)

En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)
Thanks for sharing

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)

BTW, I'm basing my work on a tool I created which exploits [#meltdown](#) to determine whether or not host is affected by the vulnerability, follow it: [github.com/raphaelsc/Am-I...](#)

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Péricles L. Machado
[@pmachado](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)

Did you try violate the virtual machine encapsulation? Or try to access the host machine from a LXC or docker?

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En réponse à [@pmachado](#)

Pericles, not yet, but reading the papers and docs out there, I have seen security researchers saying they can inspect data of other guests in a shared tenant environment in the cloud

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Dick Morrell
[@TheSecurityBod](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#) [@pmachado](#)

Raphael keep up the good work

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En réponse à [@TheSecurityBod](#) [@pmachado](#)

thanks, Dick!

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Crypto Pietje [NO1761]
[@CryptoPietje](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)

Is this true for all SSH implementations or 'just' a specific one like OpenSSL?

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locotx ftw 2002
[@locotx_ftw_2002](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)

Interesting.

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Evan Klitzke
[@eklitzke](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)

Really unfortunate that we live in a world where O_DIRECT can be considered a security measure.

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En réponse à [@CryptoPietje](#) [@CryptoYoda1338](#)

[@CryptoYoda1338](#) not sure about other implementations, but this one is pretty much used everywhere. We all trusted Intel when writing our software for proper isolation, and when that is broken, we're basically all doomed. We should patch our systems AS FAST AS POSSIBLE!

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Joseph LeRoy
[@josephbleroy](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)

So from my understanding, anyone who shares the same physical system on a cloud provider (such as AWS) has the ability to read my SSH private key contents from memory?

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Joseph LeRoy
[@josephbleroy](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)

In theory, they would be able to gain access to my system if they retrieved my private key. Ways to mitigate this would be to whitelist only certain IP addresses from logging in locally / remotely and setting up MFA. Does this sound correct?

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Martin Sundhaug
[@sundhaug92](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#) [@CryptoPietje](#) [@CryptoYoda1338](#)

tbh, it's a bit hard to not trust your CPU

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Martin Sundhaug
[@sundhaug92](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#) [@CryptoPietje](#) [@CryptoYoda1338](#)

It's like not trusting physics

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Raphael Carvalho
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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#)

For anyone interested, direct io (cache bypassing) would only tighten the time range the private key is vulnerable. In other words, private key would be vulnerable while ssh program is running, whereas right now private key is vulnerable while it is not purged from page cache.

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Raphael Carvalho
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En réponse à [@josephbleroy](#)

Don't know yet to which extent malicious guest sharing host could get into host's address space, but assuming it can read all kernel space, it has access to all RAM which is mapped in the kernel space, meaning your private key is vulnerable :-)

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dnet
[@dn3t](#)

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En réponse à [@leyrer](#) [@raphael_scarv](#)

when you have your private keys in *.pem files instead of dedicated HW (smart card, HSM), you have deeper issues

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Gunstick
[@GunstickULM](#)

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En réponse à [@raphael_scarv](#) [@Ministraitior](#)

While you are at it, how vulnerable are keys in ssh-agent?

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